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ABSTRACT
The nature of offshore oil and gas activities is changing as companies are
forced into difficult and remote areas, including the U.S. Arctic Ocean. As
evidenced by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and Shell’s error-plagued
efforts to drill exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012, the
rules governing whether and under what conditions to allow offshore drilling
in frontier areas have not kept pace with environmental and technical
changes. These rules were implemented in 1979 and have remained
substantively the same since. Recent changes to at the Department of the
Interior to disband the Minerals Management Service, improve certain safety
requirements, and move toward implementing Arctic-specific spill prevention
and response requirements are important steps. Those changes, however,
apply only after the decision to allow oil and gas activity has been made.
Congress has not amended the governing statute, and the agency has not
modified in any meaningful way the regulations that govern the initial
processes through which it decides whether and under what circumstances to
allow offshore oil and gas activities in a given area. This Article argues that
the regulations that govern offshore oil and gas planning and leasing should
be fundamentally revised to account for changes in the industry and agency,
remedy broadly acknowledged deficiencies, and reflect new administrative
policies. It also recommends a path to achieve the needed change.
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INTRODUCTION
“The deterioration of the environment is in large measure the result of our
inability to keep pace with progress. We have become victims of our own
technological genius.”1
The nature of offshore oil and gas activities is changing. More and
more, companies are forced into difficult and remote areas, including
the U.S. Arctic Ocean and ultra-deepwater. At the same time, Arctic
waters are growing warmer, sea ice is declining rapidly, and the ocean is
becoming more acidic.2 Increasing attention from the scientific
community, politicians, and the public at large has been focused on
government choices about how to balance the desire for affordable
energy with the need to maintain healthy, functioning ocean ecosystems
in the Arctic. As evidenced by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and
Shell’s error-plagued efforts to drill exploration wells in the Chukchi
and Beaufort seas in 2012,3 the rules governing whether and under what
conditions to allow offshore drilling in frontier areas have not kept pace
with environmental and technical changes.
After the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound and
the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout, Congress enacted legislation designed
to enhance safety, improve government decision-making, and prevent
future marine oil disasters.4 To date, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and
the problems experienced by Shell in the Arctic have not spurred similar
congressional action. Though Congress has not addressed deficiencies in
the law, the Department of the Interior (DOI) has taken some steps to
address obvious problems. Most notably, it disbanded the Minerals
Management Service and replaced it with three independent successor
agencies, improved certain safety requirements, and moved toward
implementing Arctic-specific spill prevention and response
requirements.5

1. 1969 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD
NIXON 222 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971).
2. Arctic
Sea
Ice
Decline,
WEATHER
UNDERGROUND,
http://www.wunderground.com/climate/SeaIce.asp (last viewed Oct. 3, 2014);
Assessment of Arctic Ocean Acidification Studies Seawater pH, ARCTIC COUNCIL (July
2013), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/resources/ news-andpress/news-archive/762-assessment-of-arctic-ocean-acidification-studiesseawater-ph.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41485, REORGANIZATION OF
THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL 2 (2010). As explained below, at least some of the problems
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While necessary and laudable, the substantive changes undertaken
by DOI apply only after the decision to allow oil and gas activity has
been made. DOI has not modified in any meaningful way the planning
and leasing regulations that govern the initial processes through which
the agency decides whether and under what circumstances to allow
offshore oil and gas activities in a given area. These rules have remained
essentially unchanged from their initial promulgation more than three
decades ago. They have not kept pace with changes in the industry, and
they fail to provide effective guidance, reflect new agency culture,
incorporate updated analytical methodologies, or conform to modern
policy priorities.
Existing law gives DOI ample flexibility to make meaningful
changes to these outdated planning and leasing regulations. Regulatory
reform could yield a more transparent and inclusive framework to guide
decision-making about offshore oil and gas activities. Improved
regulations could further good governance by providing for an
appropriate balance of costs and benefits, the means to effectively
identify and mitigate risks, a measure of consistency and certainty for
corporate stakeholders, and meaningful protections for sensitive areas.
These benefits could yield substantial improvements in agency decisionmaking processes and outcomes in the Arctic Ocean.
This Article argues in favor of revising the regulations that govern
offshore oil and gas planning and leasing and recommends a path to
achieve the needed change. While this Article focuses on application of
these regulations to oil and gas activities in the frontier areas—the Arctic
Ocean and ultra-deepwater—reform could yield benefits in all federal
waters. The first Part of this Article briefly summarizes the history of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, its provisions, and its implementing
regulations. Part II explains the need for reform, and Part III identifies
the changes that have—and have not—been implemented to date. Part
IV addresses DOI’s authority to make the necessary changes. Finally,
this Article concludes by suggesting one path DOI could follow if it
chooses to revise its existing regulations.

I.

THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT AND
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

Federal offshore oil and gas activities are governed by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).6 OCSLA calls for the
addressed by these changes were apparent before the Deepwater Horizon tragedy
and Shell’s 2012 season. See infra Part II.B.
6. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
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“expeditious and orderly development” of offshore oil and gas
resources, “subject to environmental safeguards.”7 The Parts that follow
give a brief history of OCSLA, summarize the framework established by
the statute, and describe the relevant implementing regulations.
A.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

Congress enacted OCSLA in 1953.8 While the original statute
authorized development of oil and gas resources on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS), it did not establish a systematic approach to
management; it failed to address oil pollution liability, state and local
government involvement, injury to other users of the OCS,
environmental concerns, and long-term energy policy.9
In 1978, Congress sought to remedy some of these weaknesses
through comprehensive amendments to the statute.10 Those
amendments were designed to improve lease administration, promote
greater involvement of states and localities, and enhance safety and
environmental protection.11 The 1978 amendments required oil and gas
leasing programs intended to encourage more balanced development,
less environmental damage, and fewer impacts on coastal zones.12 The
amendments also created an oil and gas information program within the
United States Geological Survey, established an offshore oil spill
pollution fund, provided grants to coastal states, and established
contingency funds for fishermen.13 In short, Congress intended the 1978
amendments to create a “new statutory regime” that would rein in
agency discretion and address the environmental shortcomings of the
1356b (2012).
7. § 1332(3) (2012).
8. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462
(1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2012).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 53 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450,
1460–61.
10. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–
372, 92 Stat. 629. The only amendment to OCSLA prior to 1978 concerned the
application of state law to OCS activities. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 (2012); 43
U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). Section 19(f) of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 made
existing state law applicable to OCS activities, rather than state laws in force at
the time of OCSLA’s original enactment. Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 19(f), 88 Stat. 2126,
2146.
11. H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, supra note 9, at 55; see Robert B. Krueger & Louis
H. Singer, An Analysis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,
19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909, 911–22 (1979) (providing a more detailed overview of
changes made by the 1978 amendments to OCSLA).
12. 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). Current regulation of five-year leasing programs
occurs under 30 C.F.R. §§ 556.16–556.28.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, supra note 9, at 55.
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original statute.14
While Congress has amended OCSLA since 1978, it has not
fundamentally altered the management scheme.15 Today, the framework
for government decisions about OCS oil and gas activities is wellestablished under the law.
B.

OCSLA Framework

OCSLA establishes a four-stage process for offshore oil and gas
planning, exploration, and development.16 First, the Secretary of the
Interior develops a nationwide leasing program, which establishes a
five-year schedule of proposed lease sales.17 The plan must indicate, “as
precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity
which . . . will best meet national energy needs” and “obtain a proper
balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential
for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on
the coastal zone.”18
Second, DOI holds the lease sales scheduled in the five-year leasing
program. OCSLA calls for DOI to auction lease tracts in a competitive
bidding process; successful companies obtain a conditional right “to
explore, develop, and produce the oil and gas contained within the lease
area.”19
Third, companies submit, and the government evaluates, plans to
drill exploration wells on purchased leases.20 In addition to exploration
drilling, companies may apply to conduct seismic testing and other

14. Id. at 53–55 (“The increased importance of OCS resources, the increased
consideration of environmental and onshore impacts, and emphasis on
comprehensive land use planning require that Congress detail standards and
criteria for the Secretary to follow in the exercise of his authority.”).
15. Most recently, OCSLA was amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
which granted the Department of the Interior (DOI) jurisdiction for OCS
renewable energy projects. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
16. See Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269, 273 (2011); LeVine, et al., Oil and Gas in
America’s Arctic Ocean: Past Pr’oblems Counsel Precaution, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV
(forthcoming 2015).
17. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
18. § 1344(a)(3), (1). As a result of litigation in the early 1980s, these plans
are prepared in years ending in 2 and 7. See LeVine, et al. supra note 16. The
current plan, for example, encompasses 2012–17, BOEM, PROPOSED FINAL OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM (2012), and BOEM will prepare
the 2017-2022 program next.
19. § 1337(b)(4).
20. § 1340(c)(1)
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activities on their lease tracts.21 Such activities are subject to approvals
separate from the exploration plan process.
Fourth, if companies find resources warranting production, they
may submit proposals for development. Operators’ activities must
conform with approved development and production plans.22
In addition to adhering to the mandates established by OCSLA,
government agencies involved in offshore oil and gas activities must
satisfy the requirements of a variety of other statutes including the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Clean Water Act, Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, Endangered Species Act, and Marine Mammal
Protection Act. While NEPA applies at all four stages of the process, the
requirements of the other statutes are not triggered by the preparation of
a five-year leasing program.23
C.

Implementing Regulations

Although OCSLA provides a process for decisions about offshore
oil and gas activities, the framework is relatively broad and gives DOI
substantial flexibility to determine exactly how and where oil and gas
activities should be planned and permitted on the OCS.24 Regulations
implementing this framework should provide regulators, oil and gas
companies, and the general public with the information and
mechanisms needed to implement the statute in a manner consistent
with Congress’s objectives. In practice, however, DOI’s regulations often
fall short of the mark.
Although federal agencies can and should address other issues
related to the implementation of OCSLA and the other statutes noted
above, this Article focuses primarily on DOI regulations governing the
first two phases of the OCSLA process: development of a five-year

21. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., EFFECTS OF OIL AND GAS
ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN: SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT
ES-1 to ES-4 (2013).
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1).
23. See Hartsig, supra note 16, at 273–74. Prior to 2010, companies seeking to
operate in the Arctic were subject to EPA regulations implementing the Clear
Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. 7627(a), (b) (2010). A legislative rider attached to the 2011
Omnibus Appropriations Act transferred the authority to regulate air emissions
from offshore activities in OCS area adjacent to the North Slope Borough of
Alaska back to the Department of the Interior.. See Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 432, 125 Stat. 785, 1048–49. Similarly, prior to
2011, Alaska’s Coastal Management Program applied to oil and gas activities in
federal waters. That program was allowed to expire in 2011. Tim Bradner, State’s
Coastal Zone Management Authority to Expire This Month, ALASKA J. OF COMMERCE
(June 3, 2011), http://classic.alaskajournal.com/stories/060311/loc_sczm.shtml.
24. See infra Part III.A.
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program and leasing under that program.
When originally passed by Congress in 1953, OCSLA gave DOI
authority to lease OCS lands for oil and gas production.25 DOI
promulgated the first regulations under this authority in 1954.26 In the
following years, DOI updated these regulations as the agency refined its
procedures and OCS activities expanded.27 Although DOI made
substantive changes to its OCS leasing regulations between 1954 and
1978, the scope of these early regulations was ultimately limited by the
scope of the original statute.
The 1978 amendments to OCSLA mark the transition to the
framework in place today. Not surprisingly, those amendments
triggered a major overhaul of DOI’s OCS regulations in 1979.28
In the 35 years since, changes have been made to the regulations
governing revenue, safety, and operations.29 The planning and leasing
regulations, however, have remained largely unchanged since their
implementation in 1979.30 Between 1980 and 2011, DOI made a total of
twenty-five amendments to these planning and leasing regulations.31 Of
those, only eight were substantive; the remaining seventeen
implemented technical corrections, re-designations, and definitional
updates.
Of the eight substantive changes, only two were significant. In both
cases, the changes were largely directed at operations on leases once
they have been purchased.32 In 1999, DOI amended its regulations to
25. Section 5 of the original OCSLA of 1953 provides for administration of
leasing, Section 6 for maintenance of leases, and Section 8 for leasing procedures.
Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 464–65 (1953).
26. Oil and Gas Leasing in Lands Under Rights-of-Way, 19 Fed. Reg. 9041
(Dec. 23, 1954) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 221).
27. For example, in 1975, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) amended
its leasing regulations to establish joint bidding procedures and restrict the
ability of major oil companies to bid together and to allow alien permanent
residents to bid on and hold OCS leases. 43 C.F.R. § 3300.1, 3302.3-3 (1975). BLM
also revised its regulations to require oil and gas companies to provide certain
exploration data to the U.S. Geological Survey. 30 C.F.R. §§ 251.12, 252.3 43
C.F.R. § 3302.3-3 (1978).
28. See Outer Continental Shelf Minerals Leasing and Rights-of-Way
Granting Programs, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,268 (June 29, 1979 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt.
2880). Changes in regulations governing production operations, however, are
beyond the scope of this article.
29. See infra Part III.B.
30. These regulations are currently codified at 30 C.F.R. §§ 556.16–556.28
(2012) (five-year planning) and §§ 556.29–556.80 (leasing).
31. See infra Table A (summarizing the history of 30 C.F.R. pt. 556 from
implementation to present).
32. See, e.g., Postlease Operations Safety, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,756 (Dec. 28, 1999)
(codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (updating and clarifying requirements related to
post-lease operations and setting out operator disqualification criteria, among
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clarify post-lease operating and diligence requirements.33 Among other
things, the amendments allowed for disqualification of operators with
repeated poor performance.34 The second major change came in 2002,
when DOI updated decommissioning requirements to improve their
clarity and bring the regulations in line with current technologies.35 The
remaining six substantive amendments to the planning and leasing
regulations had only minor impact: three changes to surety bond
provisions, an alteration of lease terms based on water depth, and two
changes to the royalty program.36 None of these changes affected the
regulations that govern DOI’s choices about whether and under what
conditions to allow offshore oil and gas leasing; the regulations
governing those decisions remain more or less the same as they were
thirty-five years ago.
In addition to being outdated, DOI’s planning and leasing
regulations are functionally deficient. The regulations governing the
five-year planning process, for example, provide no substantive
direction for agency staff or decision-makers to employ as they try to
meet the statutory directive to “select the timing and location of leasing,
to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance
between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the
discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the
coastal zone.”37 Nor can they be read to include any useful standards,
other requirements); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer
Continental Shelf—Decommissioning Activities, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,398 (May 17,
2002) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 250, 256) (updating decommissioning
requirements for oil and gas operations in the OCS).
33. Postlease Operations Safety, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,756.
34. Although this provision has been in the regulations for the past fifteen
years, the Bureau of Ocean Management (BOEM) and Bureau of Safety
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) have never disqualified an operator on the
basis of performance. Instead the agencies and their predecessor, the Minerals
Management Service, have relied on Performance Improvement Plans to change
operator behavior. On BSEE’s website only two operators are listed as
participating in Performance Improvement Plans: TALOS Energy LLC is listed
as currently participating, and Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC is
listed as previously participating. Performance Improvement Plans, BUREAU OF
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee.gov/Inspectionand-Enforcement/Enforcement-Programs/Performance_improvement_Plans
(last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
35. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—
Decommissioning Activities, 67 Fed. Reg. at 35,398 (“[This rule] restructured the
requirements to make the regulations easier to read and understand . . . [and]
updated requirements to reflect changes in technology.”).
36. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45,255; 61 Fed. Reg. 55,887; 62 Fed. Reg. 36,995; 66 Fed.
Reg. 11,512; 66 Fed. Reg. 60,147; 73 FR 52,917. See Table A for a summary of
these changes.
37. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3); id. § 1344(a)(1). BOEM has stated that “[s]triking

ARCTICLE - LEVINE ET AL. (DO NOT DELETE)

2014

WHAT ABOUT BOEM?

12/29/2014 6:10 PM

239

guidelines, or benchmarks to guide consideration of the nine factors that
the statute requires the agency to consider in allocating the “[t]iming
and location of exploration, development, and production” among the
various ocean regions.38 Instead, the existing regulations cover only:
nominations for inclusion of areas in the plan; public notice, including
review by state and local governments; consultation; consistency with
state coastal zone management programs; reports from federal agencies;
and requirements for area identification and lease tract size.39 The closest
the regulations come to providing guidance on the balancing required in
crafting the leasing program are the directions to the agency to
“evaluate fully the potential effect of leasing on the human, marine and
coastal environments, and develop measures to mitigate adverse
impacts, including lease stipulations.”40
The regulations governing lease sales are similarly devoid of
substantive direction with regard, for example, to determining whether
to hold a scheduled sale and what portions of the OCS program area
should be included in that sale. In fact, the only explicit requirement
regarding the ocean environment is the direction to “develop measures,
including lease stipulations and conditions, to mitigate adverse impacts
on the environments.”41 All of the remaining regulations describe
opportunities for comment, bidding requirements and systems,
bonding, or other procedural requirements.42

this balance based on a consideration of the principles and factors enumerated in
section 18(a) is a matter of judgment for which no ready formula exists. Section
18 requires the consideration of a broad range of principles and factors rather
than imposing an inflexible formula for making decisions.” BOEM, PROPOSED
FINAL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 188 (2012).
Without regulatory guidance to help it undertake that balancing, the agency in
2012 was left to quote extensively from the D.C. Circuit opinions evaluating
challenges to its earlier efforts. Id. at 191–93.
38. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2). For example, OCSLA Section 18(a)(2)(B) requires
consideration of “an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and
environmental risks among the various regions.” Id. § 1344(a)(2)(B). BOEM
meets this obligation using a net benefits calculation. See BOEM, PROPOSED FINAL
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 134 (2012). There are no
regulations to guide this analysis, the factors considered, or reliance on the
conclusions reached.
39. 30 C.F.R. §§ 556.16–556.28 (2011).
40. Id. § 556.26(b).
41. Id. § 556.29(a).
42. Id. §§ 556.29–.80. Separate regulations govern lease cancellation and
suspension. See §§ 550.181–.185.
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II. THERE IS CLEAR NEED TO REFORM THE AGENCY’S PLANNING
AND LEASING REGULATIONS
DOI’s regulations have not kept pace with changes in the oil and
gas industry since the late 1970s. The following Subparts describe the
rapid pace of change, calls for regulatory change, and the new priorities
that are not reflected in existing regulations.
A.

Rapid Change and Growing Challenges in the Oil and Gas
Industry

The nature of the offshore oil and gas industry has changed
substantially since DOI promulgated its planning and leasing
regulations in the late 1970s. Most notably, exploration and production
have been forced to deeper and more remote waters. These places in the
ocean—ultra-deepwater and the Arctic Ocean—are often referred to as
“frontier areas,” and it is widely recognized that good management of
the resources in these frontier areas requires particular care.43
In the Gulf of Mexico, offshore exploration and development began
in shallower waters on the continental shelf. In the 1980s, however,
economic and geologic factors pushed the industry to explore “larger
fields in deeper waters.”44 Discoveries in deeper water led to producing
wells in the 1990s, and by the end of that decade, deepwater production
surpassed production from shallow waters.45 Shortly thereafter,
deepwater wells were producing twice as much oil as shallow water
wells, and a growing amount of that oil came from “ultra-deepwater”
wells more than 5,000 feet below the ocean surface.46 At the same time,
“[d]rilling contractors developed a new generation of vessels that took
drilling from 5,000 to 10,000 feet of water, and from 20,000 to 30,000 feet
of sub-seafloor depth.”47 At these extreme depths, operating challenges
include: extreme pressure and temperature; difficult and poorly

43. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 300–01 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPOOILCOMMISSION.pdf.
44. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING 7 (2010), available at
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/20121211011815/http://www.o
ilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/A%20Brief%20History%
20of%20Offshore%20Drilling%20Working%20Paper%208%2023%2010.pdf.
45. Id. at 9–10.
46. Id.
47. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 37.
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understood geology; increased distances from reservoir to drilling unit;
exposure to ocean currents; the need to use remotely operated vehicles;
and the presence of methane hydrates.48 Despite these challenges,
deepwater production is likely to grow in importance.49
Similarly, the growing interest in exploring for oil and gas in the
Arctic Ocean has been described as part of a new Arctic “gold rush.”50
Energy companies spent billions of dollars purchasing leases and
pursuing exploration in federal waters of the U.S. Arctic Ocean in the
1980s and early 1990s.51 However, no development resulted, and by
2000, industry had allowed almost all of those leases to expire.52 A
decade or so later, changing conditions in the Arctic, high energy prices,
and rising demand led to renewed interest in the region. Between 2003
and 2008, energy companies purchased more than 1 million acres of
leases in the Beaufort Sea and more than 2 million acres in the Chukchi
Sea.53 Shell sought approvals to drill exploration wells beginning in
2007,54 but the company has yet to complete any wells.55

48. Id. at 51–52.
49. Oversight Hearing on “The Final Report from the President’s National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Before the H.
Comm. on Natural Res., 112th Cong. 37 (2011) (joint statement of the Honorable
Bob Graham, Co-Chairman, National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, and the Honorable William K. Reilly,
Co-Chairman, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling) [hereinafter Graham & Reilly Testimony]; see also NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING, supra note 44, at 15 (“[M]ost experts
project the world’s appetite for oil and other fuels to grow for the foreseeable
future. The role of deepwater oil and gas in providing that energy is also likely
to grow.”).
50. See, e.g., Isaac Arnsdorf, Diamonds to Oil Bring Gold Rush Dreams to
Melting
Arctic,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
30,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-29/diamonds-to-oil-bring-goldrush-dreams-to-melting-arctic.html.
51. See LeVine, et al. supra note 16 (forthcoming 2015).
52. Id.
53. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., HISTORICAL LEASE SALE SUMMARY
TABLE,
(May
13,
2014),
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/
uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing
_and_Plans/Leasing/Historical_Alaska_Region_Lease_Sales.pdf.
54. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: SHELL OFFSHORE
INC.
BEAUFORT
SEA
EXPLORATION
PLAN
2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions
/Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental_Analysis/2007-009.pdf.
55. See Clifford Krauss, Shell Submits a Plan for New Exploration of Alaskan
Arctic
Oil,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Aug.
28,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/business/shell-submits-a-plan-for-newalaskan-arctic-oil-exploration.html?_r=0 (showing that Shell is continuing its
pursuit of Arctic drilling but has not yet succeeded).
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The challenges of operating in the Arctic Ocean are different, but no
less severe, than those in deepwater environments.56 These challenges
include “extreme cold, extended seasons of darkness, hurricane-strength
storms, and pervasive fog,” and the need to protect rich, sensitive, and
important ecosystems.57 There is very limited infrastructure in the
region: the nearest Coast Guard station is in Kodiak, Alaska, roughly
1,000 miles from the likely locations of oil and gas exploration,58 and the
nearest large deepwater port is in Dutch Harbor.59 There is no proven
method to respond effectively in icy waters, and traditional response
methods may be ineffective.60 In addition, the Arctic region is changing
rapidly as a result of warming climate, and the lack of information about
the marine ecosystem or those changes makes it difficult to assess or
mitigate the effects of industrial activities.61

56. See LeVine, et al., supra note 16 (forthcoming 2015).
57. Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note 49, at 38; see also Legislative
Hearing on H.R. 2231 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. of the H.
Comm. on Natural Res., 112th Cong. 2–7 (2013) (statement of Michael LeVine,
Pacific Senior Counsel, OCEANA).
58. Dan Joling, Critics Say Grounding Shows Arctic Drilling Danger, USA
TODAY, (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
01/02/arctic-drilling-danger/1805577/.
59. See Deborah Zabarenko, Arctic Oil Spill Would Challenge Coast Guard,
REUTERS (Jun. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/us-arcticoil-idUSTRE75J6O620110620 (quoting U.S. Coast Guard Adm. Robert Papp Jr. as
saying that “[t]here is nothing up there to operate from at present and we’re
really starting from ground zero”).
60. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, NOT SO FAST: SOME PROGRESS IN SPILL
RESPONSE, BUT US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT (2009),
available at http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/401/files/original/
Not_So_Fast_Some_Progress_in_Spill_Response_but_US_Still_Unprepared_for_
Arctic_Offshore_Development.pdf?1345754373 (showing difficulties with spill
response in Alaska); PEW ENV’T GRP., OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE
U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN: UNEXAMINED RISKS, UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES 73–75
(2010),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/
oceans_north_legacy/page_attachments/Oil-Spill-Prevention.pdf (showing the
particular risks associated with drilling in the Arctic); Jacob D. Unger, note,
Regulating the Arctic Gold Rush: Recommended Regulatory Reforms to Protect Alaska’s
Arctic Environment from Offshore Oil Drilling Pollution, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 280–90
(2014) (proposing a multi-factor reform to better align corporate incentives and
to compensate harmed individuals for losses due to oil spills).
61. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT AND PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A
RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC 8 (2013), available at http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/
Publications/misc_pdf/IAMreport.pdf.
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The Need for Reform Has Been Broadly Recognized in Light of
the Tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico and Accidents and NearMisses in the Arctic

The risks inherent in operating in frontier areas have been
underscored by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and by the
substantial problems that Shell encountered in its efforts to drill
exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas in 2012. Those
problems and their causes have been detailed elsewhere and are not
repeated here.62 It is instructive, however, to note that both events
spurred broad calls for reform.
The need for reform was, at least in part, evident even before the
Deepwater Horizon tragedy. Before the accident, DOI had initiated two
studies: one “to examine how to upgrade the safety inspection program
for offshore rigs,” and the other “to analyze issues associated with
drilling in the Arctic.”63 In addition, there was substantial evidence that
close relationships between regulators and industry resulted in criminal
and unethical behavior as well as problems with oversight of industry
operations.64 In January 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar
announced “an ethics reform initiative in response to the problems
identified at [the Minerals Management Service] and elsewhere in the
agency.”65 There were also identified problems with the agency’s
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),

62. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND
OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43; U.S. COAST GUARD,
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MULTIPLE
RELATED MARINE CASUALTIES AND GROUNDING OF THE MODU KULLUK (2014),
available
at
http://www.uscg.mil/d17/sectoranchorage/command/
KULLUK%20Investigation.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REVIEW OF SHELL’S
2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION PROGRAM (2013).
63. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES,
PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL
AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 2 n.3 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100816ceq-mms-ocs-nepa.pdf.
64. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: MMS OIL MARKETING GROUP–LAKEWOOD (2008), available
at
https://web.archive.org/web/20081002100545/http://www.doioig.gov/
upload/RIK%20REDACTED%20FINAL4_082008%20with%20transmittal%209_1
0%20date.pdf (describing the scandal in which MMS employees developed close
personal relationships with industry members).
65. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 78 (citing Press Release, U.S.
Department of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Launches Ethics Reform Initiative
in Meeting with Minerals Management Service).
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including in Alaska.66
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill triggered much more intense
scrutiny of existing OCS oil and gas practices, including the creation of a
Presidential Commission tasked with determining the causes of the
disaster, improving oil spill response, and “recommend[ing] reforms to
make offshore energy production safer.”67 According to the co-chairmen
of the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon and Offshore
Drilling:
The explosion at the Macondo well and the ensuing enormous
spill—particularly jarring events because of the belief they
could never happen—force a reexamination of many widely
held assumptions about how to reconcile the risks and benefits
of offshore drilling, and a candid reassessment of the nation’s
policies for the development of a valuable resource. They also
support a broader reexamination of the nation’s overall energy
policy.68
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, many of the reforms
identified as necessary understandably focused on safety, oversight, and
accident prevention and response.69 Calls for reform, however, were not
limited to those areas. Experts also identified the need to reconsider how
decisions are made about “whether, when, where, and how to engage in
offshore drilling”70—choices that are made during the planning and
lease-sale phases of the OCSLA process. There were specific calls for
DOI to change the manner in which it undertook planning, leasing, and
environmental review. The National Commission, for example,
identified the need for “a more comprehensive overhaul of both leasing
and the regulatory policies and institutions used to oversee offshore

66. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-276, OFFSHORE OIL
AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICES ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IN THE
NORTH ALEUTIAN BASIN (2010).
67. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at vi.
68. Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note 49, at 36; see also U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT
BOARD REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 1 (2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfi
le&PageID=43677 (“The accident and ensuing spill challenged 40 years of
generally accepted belief that offshore operations could occur safely under
existing regulation and oversight.”).
69. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 249–78.
70. Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note 49, at 36.
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activities.”71 It determined that management and oversight—on the part
of both government and industry—had not “kept pace with rapid
changes in the technology, practices, and risks associated with the
different geological and ocean environments being explored and
developed for oil and gas production.”72
The National Commission concluded that “[f]undamental reform”
was “needed in both the structure of those in charge of regulatory
oversight and their internal decision-making process to ensure their
political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full consideration of
environmental protection concerns.”73 Similarly, there have been
repeated calls to reform the NEPA regulations at all stages of the
OCSLA process.74 The Council on Environmental Quality, for example,
recommended reforms designed to address shortcomings in the
application of NEPA to OCS activities.75
In addition to recommending general reforms that apply to all
areas of the OCS, the National Commission also identified the specific
need to reform the OCS leasing process in frontier areas, including the
Arctic:
In less well-explored areas, Interior should reduce the size of
lease sales so their geographic scope allows for a meaningful
analysis of potential environmental impacts and identification
of areas of ecological significance. A bidder on tracts in these
areas and all other areas should be able to demonstrate, in
addition to financial prequalification and ability to contain a
maximum-size spill, experience operating in similar
environments and a record of safe, environmentally
responsible operation—either in the United States or as verified
by a peer regulator for another country. The distinction
between the OCS and less well-explored areas in the Gulf
should be defined by the new entity in charge of leasing and
environmental science.76

71. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 250.
72. Id. at 251.
73. Id. at vii.
74. See, e.g., id. at 261 (“The Council on Environmental Quality and the
Department of the Interior should revise and strengthen the NEPA policies,
practices, and procedures to improve the level of environmental analysis,
transparency, and consistency at all stages of the OCS planning, leasing,
exploration, and development process.”); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
supra note 63, at 23-29.
75. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 63, at 4.
76. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 262.
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Similar calls for fundamental reform were again heard, with
renewed vigor, in the wake of the grounding of Shell’s Kulluk drilling
unit and the numerous other problems encountered by Shell during its
2012 Arctic drilling attempts.77 Shell’s failed efforts to complete
exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas triggered reviews
and evaluations that reinforced the broad need for reform.78 In the Coast
Guard report on the grounding of the Kulluk, the Assistant
Commandant states that “the inadequate assessment and management
of risks by the parties involved was the most significant causal factor in
the mishap” and expresses dismay at the “significant number and
nature of the potential violations of law and regulations.”79 Similarly,
DOI’s review of Shell’s 2012 drilling season identified the need for
Arctic-specific safety and response regulations.80 The need to reform
NEPA processes in the Arctic region was identified even prior to 2012.81
In sum, many of the problems that have come to light in the past
decade, and the resulting calls for reform, involve systemic failures in
DOI’s culture, decision-making, planning, and evaluation of potential
in-the-water impacts. As many of the analyses show, regulatory changes
should be informed by a holistic view of the way government makes
decisions about whether and under what conditions to allow oil and gas
leasing, exploration, and development. It is not sufficient simply to
examine safety, oversight, and revenue. Though those issues are
important, true reform requires reexamining all aspects of the relevant
decisions. In this reexamination, the planning and leasing stages are
significant, because they occur before rights are transferred to energy
companies. Once an OCS lease has been sold, it becomes much more
difficult and costly for the government to prevent or significantly curtail
exploration activities. While OCSLA does allow the government to

77. See Dan Joling, Shell Kulluk Ship Investigation Called For By House
Democrats, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/01/03/shell-kulluk-ship-investigation_n_2404904.html.
78. See Ed Crooks, US Reviews Shell’s Arctic Drilling Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES,
(Jan.
9,
2013),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/356b14ee-5a0a-11e2-88a100144feab49a.html#axzz3Eu2hk97B.
79. U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 62, at 1.
80. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 62.
81. See Letter from Carole A. Holley, Alaska Program Co-Director, Pacific
Environment, to Horst Greczmiel, Associate Director for NEPA Oversight, re:
Review of MMS NEPA Policies, Practices, and Procedures for OCS Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development (June 17, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
files/ceq/pe_ceq_nepa_comments_06_17_10_final.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 66, at 21 (finding that the process for meeting
NEPA requirements was “ill defined,” and that agency staff lacked “adequate
guidance on how . . . to implement NEPA with respect to” programs areas).
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cancel leases and prohibit exploration and development,82 this option is
rarely exercised.83 Reform, therefore, should encompass the entirety of
the OCSLA process; it should not be limited to standards that apply only
after areas have been included in leasing programs and leases have been
sold to energy companies.
C.

Existing Regulations Do Not Provide Guidance with Respect to
New Priorities and Policies

In addition to accounting for changes in the industry and calls for
reform generated by the Deepwater Horizon tragedy and Shell’s errorplagued Arctic drilling efforts, existing regulations should be updated to
ensure that planning and leasing activities adhere to administrative
priorities and policies that have been established in recent years. These
policies include efforts to ensure transparency and open government,
provide for greater stewardship of ocean and coastal resources, and
promote integrated management in the U.S. Arctic.
At the broadest level, transparency is essential to ensure the
accountability of, and good performance by, industrial operators and
contractors as well as regulatory agencies. President Obama made a
commitment to create “an unprecedented level of openness in
Government,” and “a system of transparency, public participation, and
collaboration.”84 Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget
directed executive agencies to, among other things, publish information
online, improve the quality of government information, and foster a
culture of open government.85 DOI’s planning and leasing regulations
fail to implement these directives or move toward their underlying goals
in any meaningful way; they do little to ensure the availability of public
data, studies, or other information relevant to decisions about oil and
gas planning and leasing on the OCS.

82. 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
83. Though not expressly invoking this authority, BSEE limited the depth to
which Shell was permitted to drill in 2012 in light of the company’s failure to
comply with the terms of the conditional approval granted for its exploration
proposal. BSEE Authorizes Shell Preparatory Activities in Beaufort Sea: Limited
Activities to be Conducted in Non-Oil-Bearing Zones, BSEE (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/Press-Releases/2012/BSEEAuthorizes-Shell-Preparatory-Activities-in-Beaufort-Sea/. The company had not
received requisite certification for part of its response plan. Id.
84. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 29, 2009).
85. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, THE
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Jan. 9, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-Headsof-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-3-9-09.
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Existing regulations also predate President Obama’s 2010 Executive
Order establishing a “National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean,
Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes.”86 The President declared that it is
United States policy to “protect, maintain, and restore the health and
biological diversity of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems and
resources,” to improve resiliency of ocean ecosystems, and to “use the
best available science and knowledge to inform” decisions about the
ocean.87 The Executive Order requires executive branch agencies to take
the necessary actions to implement the National Ocean Policy and its
associated stewardship principles “to the fullest extent consistent with
applicable law.”88 Existing regulations, however, provide no standards
to ensure that DOI’s planning and leasing activities comply.
With respect to the Arctic in particular, existing planning and
leasing regulations offer no standards to help regulators seeking to
comply with the National Strategy for the Arctic Region,89 which calls
for the pursuit of responsible stewardship, protection of the Arctic
environment, and conservation of the region’s resources.90 Similarly, the
Administration’s new “Integrated Arctic Management” approach is
intended to incorporate environmental, economic, and cultural needs
into more holistic management for the Arctic region.91 Existing
regulations, however, do not offer guidance to help agency officials,
industry, and the public understand how DOI’s planning and leasing
processes will accommodate the new approach.92

86. Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (July 19, 2010).
87. Id. at § 2(a).
88. Id. at § 6.
89. See generally WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION
(2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
nat_arctic_strategy.pdf.
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. at 8.
92. See id. (calling for the establishment and institutionalization of a
framework for integrated Arctic management); see also INTERAGENCY WORKING
GROUP ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND PERMITTING IN
ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC: A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 46 (2013) (defining “Integrated Arctic Management” as “a sciencebased, whole-of-government approach to stewardship and planning in the U.S.
Arctic that integrates and balances environmental, economic, and cultural needs
and objectives. It is an adaptive, stakeholder-informed means for looking
holistically at impacts and sensitivities across the U.S. Arctic and generating
sustainable solutions.”).
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III. CONGRESS HAS NOT ACTED TO REVISE OCSLA, AND NONLEGISLATIVE REFORMS HAVE YET TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN
THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCS PLANNING AND LEASING
As established in the preceding Parts, the rules governing OCS
planning and leasing are more than three decades old, do not provide
meaningful substantive guidance, have not kept pace with changes in
the industry, and do not account for new administrative policies and
priorities. Many of these failings have received additional emphasis in
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and Shell’s 2012 failures.
Congress, however, has taken no meaningful action to address the
problems, and regulatory change at DOI, while significant, has not
addressed planning or leasing.
A.

Lack of Congressional Action

In the past, Congress has taken meaningful action to address the
deficiencies in the statutory regime made apparent by major oil spills.
After the Exxon Valdez disaster, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA), which, among other things, mandated double-hulled
tankers and facility-specific spill response plans for offshore drilling
rigs.93 Earlier, the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout was one of the key factors
that led Congress to pass the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and drove Congress and the California state legislature to pass
other substantive legislation.94
The Deepwater Horizon disaster led to calls for Congress to reform
OCSLA and other statutes affecting offshore oil and gas activities and
spill response. The National Commission, for example, recommended
that “Congress should review and consider amending where necessary
the governing statutes for all agencies involved in offshore activities to
be consistent with the responsibilities functionally assigned to those
agencies.”95 More specific recommendations were made to remove or
raise OPA’s $75 million limit on a responsible party’s liability for
damages, improve the manner in which funds may be disbursed from
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, extend the 30-day deadline for
93. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2719 (2012)).
94. See, e.g., 45 Years after the Santa Barbara Oil Spill, Looking at a Historic
Disaster Through Technology, NOAA OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RESTORATION, (Jan.
28, 2014), http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/45-years-aftersanta-barbara-oil-spill-looking-historic-disaster-through-technology.html.
95. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 256.
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reviewing exploration plans, codify the division of DOI’s planning,
revenue, and enforcement functions, and better fund needed science.96
Some of the recommended changes—extending the deadline for review
of exploration plans, for example—would specifically amend provisions
of OCSLA or another statute to improve the decision-making or liability
scheme. Others—codifying the division of revenue, planning, and
enforcement, for example—would create new requirements to help
insulate decisions from political pressure and likely improve the
scientific basis for decisions.97
Despite these calls for reform, Congress took no action to amend
OCSLA or otherwise alter the standards, requirements, or decisionmaking framework applicable to offshore oil and gas activities.
Congress considered a series of proposals that would have implemented
substantive changes, but it passed only one law, the RESTORE Act,
which addresses restoration in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill
and the allocation of administrative and civil penalties.98 More recently,
congressional action has focused on efforts designed to increase offshore
leasing and production, although no legislation has been enacted.99

96. See id. at 262, 264, 283–86; see also Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note
49, at 4–5 (identifying need to codify division of DOI functions, raise the liability
limit, and raise the per incident payout amount from the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund); Unger, supra note 60 (proposing a four-step reform process to the OPA
and related laws).
97. See, e.g., Graham and Reilly Testimony supra note 49, at 9 (stating that
“[o]ther Commission recommendations will require congressional action,
especially those recommendations that seek to promote the independence of the
Offshore Safety Authority from politics”); Hartsig, supra note 16, at 311–14
(articulating the National Commission’s recommendations for an interagency
approach to facilitate expert scientific review system-wide).
98. The RESTORE Act establishes a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration
Council, allocates 80% of “all administrative and civil penalties related to the
Deepwater Horizon spill to a Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund, and outlines a
structure by which the funds can be utilized to restore and protect the natural
resources, ecosystems, fisheries, marine and wildlife habitats, beaches, coastal
wetlands, and economy of the Gulf Coast region.” RESTORE Act, GULF COAST
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION COUNCIL, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/council/
about-gulf-coast-ecosystem-restoration-council (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
99. See Offshore Energy and Jobs Act, H.R. 2231, 113th Cong. (2013) (this
bill, which passed the House of Representatives, would, among other actions,
expand offshore leasing, remove important environmental safeguards, and
prioritize oil and gas activities above other uses of ocean resources); see, e.g.,
Michael LeVine, Written Testimony for Legislative Hearing on HR 2231, the
“Offshore Energy and Jobs Act,” H.R. Comm. on Natural Resources, Subcommittee
on Energy and Mineral Resources (June 11, 2013).
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Some Progress Has Been Made to Improve Safety, Prevention,
and Response

Though Congress has not taken meaningful action other than
passing the RESTORE Act, DOI and industry have made some strides to
improve safety, prevention, and independent decision-making. While
important, none of these changes affect the manner in which the agency
evaluates planning or leasing decisions.
DOI began its reform effort by dividing the agency that had been
charged with overseeing oil and gas activities on the OCS—the Minerals
Management Service (MMS)—into the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and the Office of
Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).100 The former was tasked with
handling regulatory functions, while the latter took on the accounting
functions of the former MMS.101 Later, BOEMRE was further divided
into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), which handles
planning and approvals, and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE), which is charged with enforcement and
oversight.102 This division is at least partially responsive to the need
identified by the National Commission and others to separate revenue
collection, safety, and planning.103
Building on this division, ONRR promulgated a series of new
regulations designed to improve its revenue collection functions.104
Additionally, DOI has:
initiated additional inspections of all deepwater oil and gas
drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico and issued a safety
notice to all rig operators; drafted and implemented the 30-Day
Safety Report, including the issuance of Notices to Lessees on
100. See, e.g., HOGUE, supra note 5, at 3, 10–11.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3–4. Ken Salazar, Secretarial Order 3299: “Establishment of the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue,” DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR
(May
19,
2010),
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475.
103. See supra Part II.B; see also Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior,
Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions: Establishes Independent
Agency to Police Offshore Energy Operations (May 19, 2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/salazar-divides-mmss-threeconflicting-missions.cfm (quoting Secretary of the Interior Salazar as stating that
the purpose of the reorganization was to divide the “three distinct and
conflicting missions” of the Minerals Management Service—”effective
enforcement, energy development, and revenue collection”).
104. Rules and Regulations, OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE,
http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/default.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
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new safety and environmental requirements, and the initiation
of new rulemakings for safety and environmental protection;
established a moratorium on operations utilizing certain
equipment associated with deepwater drilling; and
implemented new requirements that operators must submit
information regarding blowout scenarios with their
Exploration Plans.105
Beyond these changes, BSEE finalized an Offshore Drilling Safety rule in
August 2012.106 “The final rule included some additional requirements
about barriers that must be in place within the wells and extended some
of the requirements pertaining to blowout preventers . . . .”107 BSEE has
also issued a draft Safety Culture Policy Statement and proposed
revisions to its Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS)
Rule.108
DOI has committed to implementing Arctic-specific safety and spill
prevention regulations.109 It has done so at least in part in response to
the deficiencies made evident by Shell’s problematic 2012 efforts to drill
exploration wells.110 These regulations are likely to codify prevention
and response measures employed in the 2012 season but not address
government planning or leasing obligations. In addition, DOI has stated
its intent to use a “targeted approach” to leasing in the Arctic, which
recognizes that some areas of the Arctic may not be suitable for leasing,
or may require specific mitigation measures.111 However, DOI has yet to

105. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 63, at 2 n.3.
106. Press Release, BSEE, BSEE Releases Offshore Drilling Safety Rule, (Aug.
15,
2012),
available
at
http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/PressReleases/2012/BSEE-Releases-Offshore-Drilling-Safety-Rule/.
107. OIL SPILL COMMISSION ACTION, ASSESSING PROGRESS THREE YEARS LATER 7
(2013), available at http://oscaction.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL_OSCANo2-booklet-Apr-2013_web.pdf.
108. Id.
109. See Tim Bradner, Interior Dept. May Have Draft Rules for Arctic by Yearend, ALASKA J. OF COMMERCE (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.alaskajournal.com/
Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/June-Issue-3-2013/Interior-Dept-may-have-draftrules-for-Arctic-by-year-end.
110. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, REVIEW OF SHELL’S 2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION
PROGRAM 6 (2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/
upload/Shell-report-3-8-13-Final.pdf (“Government and industry should
continue to evaluate the potential development of additional Arctic-specific
standards in the areas of drilling and maritime safety and emergency response
equipment and systems.”).
111. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGM’T, PROPOSED
FINAL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2012-2017 206
(2012),
available
at
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/
Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Program/2012-
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implement this change in a planning process or lease sale, and there has
been no proposal to formalize it in regulation.
Industry, too, has made progress.112 According to the former
commissioners from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, companies and spill response
organizations have “significantly expanded the quality and quantity of
the equipment to respond to a spill.”113
C.

Despite Some Progress on Other Fronts, the Regulations
Governing Planning and Leasing Have Not Improved

The reforms and policy changes enumerated above, though
potentially valuable in increasing safety, accident prevention, and spill
response, apply only after DOI has decided to allow oil and gas
activities to proceed in particular areas. None of the codified
improvements have addressed the identified deficiencies in the
administration of planning and leasing on the OCS. For example, the
former members of the National Commission “remain concerned that
[BOEM] has as yet to propose any regulations strengthening practices
and procedures for preparing [environmental impact] statements and
improving the quality of the reviews during the planning, leasing,
exploration, and development stages.”114
The planning and leasing stages are especially critical because they
are when DOI determines whether particular areas of the ocean will be
made available for leasing and potential exploration drilling and
development. To the extent that DOI and other agencies wish to
implement broad management decisions affecting the OCS—such as a
decision not to allow drilling activities in an important marine area—
they can most easily do so at the planning and leasing stages. As noted
above, once an energy company leases an area of the OCS, it becomes
significantly more difficult for the government to reverse course. For all
of these reasons, DOI should take action to reform the regulations
governing its preparation of five-year leasing programs and sale of OCS
leases.

2017_Five_Year_Program/PFP%2012-17.pdf; see id. at 7 (noting that “certain
subsets of Arctic areas will be excluded because environmental and subsistence
conditions strongly weigh in favor of keeping them off the table for exploration
and development”).
112. See generally OIL SPILL COMMISSION ACTION, supra note 107.
113. Id. at 3. The former commissioners also express hope, though tempered,
for the industry-sponsored Center for Offshore Safety. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 8.
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IV. DOI CAN TAKE ACTION THAT WOULD MEANINGFULLY
ADDRESS SHORTCOMINGS IN EXISTING PLANNING AND LEASING
REGULATIONS
As the preceding Part makes clear, both DOI and industry have
improved some of the structures, regulations, and policies that govern
offshore oil and gas activities. The reforms undertaken to date have been
necessary and important, but they have not been comprehensive, and
significant shortcomings remain. To address these shortcomings, DOI
could carry out a broader reform process—one designed to advance the
foundational changes that started when Secretary Salazar disbanded the
Minerals Management Service and created BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR.
While many aspects of DOI’s OCS regulations should be revisited,115
substantive changes to the regulations that govern the planning and
leasing stages are particularly critical.
As explained in the Parts below, OCSLA gives DOI discretion to
promulgate revised planning and leasing regulations. Revised
regulations could provide more clarity and guidance, which, in turn,
would help to ensure more effective balancing of energy development
and environmental protection. This type of regulatory reform could
remedy many of the deficiencies identified in the foregoing Parts.
A.

DOI Has the Authority to Pursue Regulatory Reform

OCSLA not only calls for the “expeditious and orderly
development” of offshore oil and gas resources, it also requires that
development to be “subject to environmental safeguards.”116 As
described above, Congress enacted the 1978 Amendments to OCSLA in
part to help ensure that efforts to develop oil and gas resources were
balanced with environmental protections.117 OCSLA’s provisions allow
DOI significant flexibility to determine how to achieve this balance, but
current regulations provide relatively little guidance. Given the
flexibility inherent in OCSLA, DOI is free to promulgate revised
regulations that provide more direction to regulators, the industry, and
the general public. In fact, with regard to leasing, OCSLA explicitly
provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may at any time prescribe
and amend . . . rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary
115. For example, DOI has not yet reformed regulations that govern its
review of exploration plans for OCS oil and gas activities. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE
BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 80.
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (2012).
117. See supra Part I.A.
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and proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste and
conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf, and
the protection of correlative rights therein . . . .”118
OCSLA’s mandate to develop a five-year OCS leasing program
offers a good example of the discretion afforded to DOI. Section 18 of
OCSLA requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a five-year OCS
leasing program that achieves “a proper balance between the potential
for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas,
and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”119 The statute
requires the Secretary to consider certain factors when making this
determination,120 but it is for the Secretary to decide what actually
constitutes a “proper balance” and determine how to measure the
various factors considered.121 Ultimately, OCSLA “gives the Secretary of
the Interior tremendous discretion.”122
Existing regulations provide no guidance to help the Secretary
strike the balance mandated by OCSLA. Regulations implementing this
section of OCSLA simply do not address this aspect of the statute. As a
result of this regulatory deficiency, “[t]he Secretary can assign
significant weight to environmental protection concerns—or not.”123
DOI has the ability to clarify the five-year program balancing
requirements imposed by OCSLA through promulgation of revised
agency regulations, so long as the new regulations are consistent with
the underlying statute.124 Given the broad statutory mandates described
above, DOI has significant latitude to develop more detailed regulations
that include standards defining the various factors and explaining how
the Secretary will consider and weigh them. Such regulations would
create an understandable and repeatable process to help ensure that
future five-year programs achieve the “proper balance” mandated by
OCSLA’s five-year planning provisions.

118. § 1334(a).
119. Id. § 1344(a)(3).
120. Id. § 1344(a)(2).
121. For example, OCSLA Section 18(a)(2)(G) requires consideration of “the
relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of
the outer Continental Shelf.”
122. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 80.
123. Id.
124. Cf. Chevron v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (holding that if Congress has not directly addressed a particular question,
courts must defer to the agency’s permissible construction of the statute).
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Improvements to OCS Planning and Leasing Regulations Could
Remedy the Shortcomings Identified in the Foregoing Sections

Carried out effectively, reform of DOI’s OCS planning and leasing
regulations could result in guidance that leads to better processes and
outcomes. Revised regulations could help ensure that DOI applies the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) consistently and receives the
full benefit of the process; is armed with knowledge sufficient to make
informed decisions; conforms to new policies that promote ocean
stewardship; and fulfills the Administration’s commitment to
transparency and open government. This type of regulatory reform
could also benefit energy companies seeking to operate on the OCS by
fostering more regulatory consistency and certainty.
Revised regulations could clarify and strengthen DOI’s application
of NEPA requirements to the OCSLA planning and leasing process. For
example, revised regulations could codify processes for NEPA
consultation and coordination among DOI agencies—such as BOEM,
BSEE, and the Fish and Wildlife Service—and with other federal
agencies including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and others. Similarly, regulations
could specify a protocol that facilitates effective consultation with
affected tribes and Native corporations. Clarifying the relationship
between OCSLA and NEPA at the planning and lease-sale stages could
also reduce confusion related to “tiering” between different levels of
environmental analysis,125 which could help eliminate analytical gaps
and ensure that environmental analyses more accurately capture the
cumulative effects of existing and anticipated development. By spelling
out exactly how the agency will comply with NEPA’s requirements at
each stage of the OCSLA process, DOI can reduce confusion, promote
consistency, and facilitate more meaningful involvement.
Adoption of revised OCS planning and leasing regulations could
also help ensure that DOI has access to the information necessary to
make wise decisions about whether, where, and how to make areas of
the OCS available for oil and gas development. For example, revised
regulations could require a certain level or quality of scientific
information about an area of the OCS before that area is included in a
five-year program or lease sale. Similarly, revised regulations could
require DOI to take certain steps to solicit and consider traditional
knowledge about marine areas under consideration for leasing. These
125. Cf. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 63 at 22–26; NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 260.
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steps would help ensure that government agencies have access to, and
take into account, information from local residents, including Alaska
Natives. Revised regulations could also ensure that regulators
understand the potential limitations of oil spill response in a given area,
which could help DOI effectively describe and weigh the potential risks
of activities in areas where there are significant hurdles to effective spill
response.
Regulatory reform can also provide direction to facilitate
compliance with the stewardship responsibilities established in the
National Ocean Policy.126 Regulations could establish standards that
help DOI ensure that its planning and leasing activities “protect,
maintain, and restore the health and biological diversity” of ocean and
coastal areas and improve resiliency of ocean ecosystems “to the fullest
extent consistent with applicable law.”127 With respect to the Arctic in
particular, revised regulations could help define how DOI comports
with the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, including its calls to
“pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship,” and “protect the Arctic
environment and conserve its resources.”128 For example, regulations
could require DOI to use available information to identify marine areas
that are most critical to ecosystem functioning, including regions
identified as subsistence use areas. Revised regulations could also codify
DOI’s “targeted approach” to leasing in the Arctic, which recognizes
that some areas of the Arctic may not be suitable for leasing or may
require specific mitigation measures.129
OCS planning and leasing regulations could also be revised to
promote more transparent and inclusive processes, consistent with
President Obama’s open government directive.130 DOI could change
existing regulations to ensure that data, studies, and other information
relevant to OCS planning and leasing processes are made available to
the public and posted online for easy access. Ensuring the availability of
information about the OCS may also help foster increased or more
meaningful public participation in OCS planning and leasing processes.
In addition, regulatory reform could have the salutary benefit of
providing certainty to companies. As one example, albeit from the
exploration phase, both ConocoPhillips and Statoil identified uncertain
126. Exec. Order No. 13,547, supra note 86.
127. Id. at §§ 2(a), 6.
128. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 89.
129. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 110, at 7 (noting that “certain
subsets of Arctic areas will be excluded because environmental and subsistence
conditions strongly weigh in favor of keeping them off the table for exploration
and development.”).
130. See supra, Part II.C.
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standards as reasons for delaying exploration in the Arctic Ocean. In
fact, ConocoPhillips announced in a press statement that it was delaying
planned exploration activities “given the uncertainties of evolving
federal regulatory requirements and operational permitting
standards.”131 Using regulatory reform to clarify the planning and
leasing processes—and the exploration plan approval process—would
provide at least a measure of the certainty that these companies seek.

CONCLUSION AND PATH FORWARD
The 1978 amendments to OCSLA were intended to ensure an
appropriate balance between the pursuit of hydrocarbon resources in
federal waters and the protection of the marine environment. All too
often, however, DOI has fallen short of this objective. Over the years,
there have been numerous calls for reform, especially in the wake of the
2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and Shell’s error-ridden effort to drill
exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012.132
DOI has taken some important steps toward better governance of
OCS oil and gas activities. The most visible and public of these changes
has been the transition from the Minerals Management Service (MMS) to
the three new agencies that have taken its place: ONRR, BSEE, and
BOEM. This change was intended to be more than a re-branding of a
troubled agency; it was meant to be a step toward fundamental change
in agency culture.133 While there has been some progress in that
direction, the cultural shift largely has yet to be codified in new or
revised agency regulations.
The exceptions to this rule have been largely directed at safety and
performance standards, such as promulgation of the 2013 Offshore
Drilling Safety Rule,134 issuance of the draft Safety Culture Policy
Statement and proposed revisions to the Safety and Environmental
Management Systems Rule,135 and the announcement of future Arcticspecific safety and prevention regulations.136 With regard to planning
and leasing, however, BOEM and BSEE still rely on outdated regulations

131. News Release, Regulatory Uncertainty Leads ConocoPhillips to Put 2014
Chukchi Sea Exploration Drilling Plans on Hold, ConocoPhillips Alaska (April
10, 2013), available at http://alaska.conocophillips.com/Documents/NR-AKChukchi%20Sea-FINAL%204-9-2013.pdf.
132. HOGUE, supra note 5, at 9.
133. See generally id.
134. Press Release, BSEE, supra note 106.
135. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 76 Fed.
Reg. 56,683 (Sep. 14, 2011) (to be codified as 30 C.F.R. pt 250).
136. Bradner, supra 109.
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that have not kept pace with changes the industry and do not reflect
new priorities and policies. Similar problems exist with respect to the
regulations that address the approval of exploration and oil spill
response plans, and it is clear that comprehensive reform is needed.
DOI is already contemplating Arctic-specific regulations aimed at
improving drilling safety and spill response in that region. The agency
should complete this process. Once the new Arctic-specific rules are
complete, DOI could announce an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and begin a suite of regulatory reforms that cover other
aspects of the OCSLA process, including the five-year planning, lease
sale, and exploration plan approval stages. This sort of comprehensive
overhaul would not be simple, and DOI might consider a step-wise
process that aims to reform one portion of the regulations at a time. This
process would take time—each portion of the regulations could easily
take a year or more to complete137—but that is all the more reason to
start now.
Announcing this type of comprehensive regulatory reform would
send a strong signal that DOI intends to keep moving forward with the
transition from the old MMS and toward a new way of doing business
on the OCS.

137. See, e.g., WILMA A. LEWIS, MARY L. KENDALL & RHEA S. SUH, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE INTERIOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BOARD REPORT TO
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 26 (2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/OCS-Safety-OversightBoard-Report.pdf (recognizing that “[r]egulations typically take years to
promulgate”).
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APPENDIX
TABLE A. 30 C.F.R. pt. 556 Amendment History Summary
Date

Federal Register

1979-06-29

44 FR 38,268

1982-10-22

47 FR 47,006

1983-09-23

48 FR 43,323

1988-01-28

53 FR 10,596

1989-12-08
1993-08-27

54 FR 50,615
58 FR 45,255

1994-10-21

59 FR 53,091

1996-07-03

61 FR 34,730

1996-10-30

61 FR 55,887

1997-05-22

62 FR 27,948

Summary
Implements OCSLA 1978 changes;
redesignates 43 CFR Subpart 2883
(rights-of-way management) into
Part 3300
Redesignates 43 CFR Part 3300
(admin. by BLM) to 30 CFR Part 256
(MMS)
Adds a new Information Collection
section to 30 CFR Part 256
Restructures and consolidates
existing rules; formalizes OCS
Orders developed to govern
operations conducted in each of
MMS’s four OCS Regions and
portions of selected Notices to
Lessees and Operators issued by
regional offices
Technical corrections
Amends surety bond provisions
Specifically states the authority of
MMS to require lessees or operators
to conduct archaeological resource
surveys and submit reports prior to
exploration, development and
production, or installation of lease
term or right-of-way pipelines;
standardizes the definition and use
of the term “archaeological
resources”
Allows agency extension of bid
acceptance period
Amends lease terms based on depth
Amends surety bond provisions;
makes other changes that reduce the
risk of default by an underfunded
operator
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Date
1997-07-10
1999-02-24
1999-03-18

Federal Register
62 FR 36,995
64 FR 9065
64 FR 13,343

1999-12-28

64 FR 72,756

2000-01-19

65 FR 2874

2001-02-23

66 FR 11,512

2001-06-19

66 FR 32,902

2001-12-03

66 FR 60,147

2002-05-17

67 FR 35,398

2005-08-25

70 FR 49,871

2005-09-26

70 FR 56,119

261

Summary
Correction to 62 FR 27948
Technical corrections
Correction to 64 FR 9065
Updates and clarifies requirements
related to post-lease operations;
allows the grant of rights-of-use and
easements for an OCS blocks to
state lessees; brings uniformity to
the public release time for all
proprietary geophysical data and
information gathered under
prelease; clarifies the distinction
between granting and directing a
suspension; requires evacuation
statistics for natural occurrences;
sets out criteria to disqualify an
operator with repeated poor
operating performance; allows
operators the opportunity to
propose alternative regulatory
approaches
Technical corrections
Establishes a new leasing incentive
framework; adds minor reporting
requirement for all leases issued
with royalty suspension and
specifies the allocation of royalty
relief on a field having lease issued
before and after 2000
Eliminates separate offshore
definition of “affected state”
Modifies surety provisions; codifies
terms and conditions under which a
surety will be relieved of
responsibility when MMS
terminates the period of liability of
a bond
Updates decommissioning
requirements
Implements new fees to offset
internal costs
Hurricane Katrina related
extensions
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Federal Register

2005-10-27

70 FR 61,891

2008-08-25

73 FR 49,943

2008-09-12

73 FR 52,917

2009-09-14

74 FR 46,904

2011-10-18

76 FR 64,432

[31:2

Summary
Hurricane Katrina related
extensions
Electronic payments
Creates bonus royalty credits for
relinquishing certain leases
Technical corrections
Redesignates 30 CFR Part 256
(MMS) to 30 CFR Part 556 (BOEM)

